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Sammendrag 
I 2004 annonserte norske myndigheter en skattereform som introduserte utbytteskatt for personlige 
aksjonærer, men ikke for aksjeselskaper som aksjonærer. Reformen medførte skatt på utbytter fra og 
med 2006. Denne endringen gav insentiver til å maksimere utbytteutbetalingene i 2004 og 2005, og til 
å holde resultatet tilbake i selskapet i etterfølgende år. Ved å bruke registerdata over norske 
aksjeselskaper observerer vi klare økninger i utbytteutbetalingene i påvente av de annonserte 
endringene, men også at den høye utbytteutbetalingen ble kompensert av at selskapets innskutte 
egenkapital økte. Etter reformen begynte selskapene å holde tilbake overskudd. Alle kategoriene av 
aktiva vokste, men veksten er størst for varige driftsmidler som utstyr, maskiner, biler, fly og båter. Vi 
finner at personlig eide selskaper og de selskapene som gikk lengst i å maksimere utbyttet i forkant av 
reformen, har lavere inntjening og økonomisk aktivitet etter reformen. Men disse selskapene holder 
samtidig tilbake overskudd og akkumulerer eiendeler i samme eller større grad som andre. Denne 
økningen i eiendeler kommer særlig i finansielle anleggsmidler (mulig substitutt for privat sparing) og 
i varige driftsmidler (mulig substitutt for privat konsum). Disse funnene kan tolkes som en indikasjon 
på en skatterespons på selskapets reelle økonomisk aktivitet og som en indikasjon på at nært eide 
aksjeselskaper brukes som skattely for aksjonærene. 
1 Introduction
In this paper, we focus on closely-held Norwegian ﬁrms for which the interaction between indi-
vidual and ﬁrm incentives cannot be ignored. In the absence of arms-length relationship between
shareholders and management  a natural situation to consider when a ﬁrm has few owners
 there is a possibility that some aspects of the behavior of a ﬁrm are motivated by owners'
personal incentives rather than maximization of the value of the ﬁrm. In particular, in the
presence of taxation, some of the ﬁrm's costs may in fact reﬂect private consumption, and some
of its investment activity may in fact be equivalent to private saving. In other words, a ﬁrm
may act as a tax shelter on top of or even instead of its core economic activity. We provide
evidence suggesting that this is so by relying on data from Norway that span a 2006 reform
that introduced taxation of dividends to personal shareholders (dividends to corporations as
shareholders remained tax free) and modiﬁed incentives for personal vs corporate ownership of
ﬁrms.
The reform we study was announced in March of 2004, and the changes in tax rules that
we will emphasize in this article were to take eﬀect from 2006. Prior to the reform, dividends
were eﬀectively not taxable (beyond regular corporate tax liability). As of January 1st 2006,
dividends to personal shareholders that exceeded a risk-free rate-of-return allowance started
being subject to a 28% tax, matching the treatment of personal capital gains. Simultaneously,
it was announced that immediately (as of March 2004) capital gains to corporate shareholders
were no longer subject to taxation. As the result, in the aftermath of the reform, personal
shareholders would prefer to hold shares through a holding ﬁrm  due to preference for capital
gains at the announcement, and due to preference for both dividends and capital gains when
fully implemented. In this paper, we document the responses to this introduction of a dividend
tax both (1) in anticipation of the reform and (2) over a longer term after the reform had been
fully implemented. Additionally, we also show some evidence of changes in ownership form, the
topic on which we focus in more details in a companion paper [Alstadsæter et al., 2013].
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms responded to the reform before its full implementation
by increasing their dividend payments and by setting up holding companies that allowed for
converting ownership from personal to corporate. Norwegian ﬁrms are subject to accounting
rules that govern retaining equity/asset ratio above 10% and that cap dividend payouts at the
level of accumulated retained earnings. We ﬁnd that for almost half of the personally owned
ﬁrms with ability to pay dividends at least one of these two constraints ends up binding in 2005.
In other words, many ﬁrms aggressively maximize their dividend payouts. However, we also
ﬁnd that these large outﬂows of accumulated funds do not necessarily correspond to reducing
the size of a ﬁrm: dividends paid out are then used to recapitalize the same ﬁrms by injecting
additional shareholder equity. As the result, in anticipation of the reform the average (though
not necessarily marginal) source of fund shifts from retained earnings toward external equity
ﬁnancing but the overall equity of the ﬁrms is not substantially aﬀected.
This close to complete compensation for dividend payments is surprising given that the
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dividend tax implies reduced return to shareholder equity in the future. Such a response is
consistent with either (1) lack of attention to tax considerations (though this is hard to believe
given that ﬁrms do respond to anticipated policy), (2) importance of liquidity constraints or
(3) ﬁrm being used for private saving (pension accounts) or ﬁnancing of private consumption
so that no taxable return is expected. We corroborate the third possibility by investigating
the behavior of ﬁrms after the reform. We show that consistently with the new tax incentives,
post-reform all ﬁrms start retaining much higher share of earnings and building up much higher
equity position. In particular, the propensity to retain earnings increases signiﬁcantly and the
correlation of dividends and proﬁts declines. The cumulative growth in retained earnings is more
pronounced for ﬁrms with personal ownership and for those that maximized dividends in either
2004 or 2005  the two groups that we use as proxies for being aﬀected by reform-induced
incentives. A potential complication in interpreting these diﬀerences as being due to the reform
is that the post-reform period overlaps with a proﬁt boom. However, indicators of real economic
activity  proﬁts, revenue and costs  all increase more for ﬁrms that are less aﬀected by the
change in incentives, indicating that the introduction of dividend tax may have had a negative
eﬀect on real economic activity. At the same time, despite weaker economic outcomes, long-term
ﬁnancial and ﬁxed assets increase more for personally than corporately owned ﬁrms, as well as
for dividend maximizing than non-maximizing ﬁrms  indicating that the retained earnings are
saved but invested in ways not leading to economic proﬁts.
Particularly striking is the diﬀerence across personally and corporately owned ﬁrms for the
subgroup of durables that includes company cars, boats, planes and other durable goods that
may be of mixed corporate/personal use. We conclude that the new incentive structure induced
ﬁrms to retain earnings but that this eﬀect at least partially corresponds to a shift toward
activities that do not translate into increasing proﬁtability, and instead are likely to reﬂect
personal saving and/or consumption within a ﬁrm.
2 Literature review
The canonical approach to analyzing the impact of corporate taxation in public ﬁnance focuses
on a ﬁrm that is pursuing its activity in order to maximize its value, while dealing with arms-
length shareholders. Accordingly, corporate and capital income tax policy may inﬂuence ﬁrm
investment behavior by inﬂuencing the marginal cost of capital. A large literature has focused on
distinguishing between two diﬀerent possibilities (see for example, Auerbach 2002 and Auerbach
and Hasset 2002). When marginal projects are ﬁnanced out of new share issues (old view),
dividend taxation distorts the marginal cost of capital; on the other hand, when marginal projects
are ﬁnanced out of retained earnings (new view), dividend taxation has no eﬀect on the cost of
(trapped) capital. Both views may apply at the same time to diﬀerent ﬁrms: indeed, old view
describes relatively cash-poor and illiquid ﬁrms, perhaps those that are relatively young; while
new view applies to ﬁrms with signiﬁcant retained earnings  old ﬁrms [see for example
Becker et al., 2013].
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This is a useful dichotomy for thinking about large publicly traded ﬁrms, although even
in this context it has been recognized that the arms-length assumption does not apply to all
parties, in particular management may have objectives that are in conﬂict with maximization
of the value of the ﬁrm. More generally, the assumption of arms-length relationship between
shareholders and management is not attractive for thinking about closely-held ﬁrms with a small
number of shareholders. In the extreme, an entrepreneur is unlikely to be interested in simply
maximizing the value of the ﬁrm, but rather in maximizing the overall level of personal utility,
with business activity being just one input.
It has been documented in the literature that some aspects of the structure of ﬁrms do re-
spond to personal tax considerations. Gordon and Slemrod [2000] have documented that the
US Tax Reform Act of 1986 led to massive conversion of corporate ﬁrms to a diﬀerent organi-
zation form of S-corporation that, in particular, implies taxation of ﬁrm proﬁts as personal tax.
Romanov [2006] showed that a tax reform in Israel, which changed the relationship between
individual and income tax rates, encouraged small businesses to incorporate. Jacob and Alstad-
sæter [2013] ﬁnd that owner-mangers in closely-held ﬁrms in Sweden rely on wages as the sticky
payout channel, while dividend payments are more responsive to changes in taxes.
The economic literature on dividend taxes and their eﬀect on payout policy and corporate
behavior proves ambiguous. In particular, little is known about long term real eﬀects on ﬁrms by
dividend taxes. Major reasons for this is lack of tax variation and compelling data. The majority
of evidence is based on samples of large, publicly traded ﬁrms. A recent wave of evidence (e.g.
Chetty and Saez [2005], Brown et al. [2007]) focuses on responses to the 2003 dividend tax cut
in the U.S. and ﬁnds evidence consistent with the importance of agency issues. Chetty and Saez
[2010] argue for a clientele eﬀect on investments following a dividend tax reform. A dividend
tax induces ﬁrms to distribute more dividends, reducing lock-in of capital and wasteful use of
resources in cash rich ﬁrms in the presence of agency problems. Cash constrained ﬁrms that rely
on new equity to ﬁnance projects can raise new capital, resulting in more investments. Even if
total investment level is more or less the same, a dividend tax change can increase productivity
through a reallocation of investments across ﬁrms. Becker et al. [2013] document this eﬀect for
listed ﬁrms using cross country ﬁrm data. Yagan [2013] ﬁnds no eﬀects of the 2003 US dividend
tax cut on overall investments of ﬁrms aﬀected by the tax cut (C-corporations) compared with
ﬁrms unaﬀected by the tax cut (S-corporations). The sample consists of large, privately traded
corporations with similar trends prior to the reform. Another issue in this literature is the
role of share repurchases. A substitution of repurchases for dividends, which leaves net equity
unaﬀected, has a similar ﬂavor to the strategy of re-injecting dividends as external equity that
we document in this paper that corresponds to issuing new shares in lieu of retaining proﬁts.
Firms are as a group very heterogeneous. The behavior of large, publicly traded ﬁrms with
dispersed ownership and separation of ownership and management is potentially diﬀerent from
that of small and medium sized ﬁrms that often are owner-managed. These ﬁrms constitute
a considerable share of the economy. Michaely and Roberts [2012] document that the payout
policies of publicly traded ﬁrms diﬀers from privately traded ﬁrms. In the present paper, we
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concentrate on closely-held ﬁrms and provide new information on their behavior. 1
Little research has been done on how taxes aﬀect ownership constellations in ﬁrms, beyond
what is done on eﬀects on owner clienteles in listed corporations [Korkeamäki et al., 2010]. One
reason for this is lack of data. To our knowledge, nothing has been done on how tax incentives
aﬀect ownership constellation and individual owners' ownership shares in smaller and medium
sized ﬁrms.
3 Background on the Norwegian tax system
3.1 Changes in the tax regime
The Norwegian dual income tax system levies a progressive tax rate on labor income and a
constant tax rate on capital income. A basic tax rate of 28 percent applies to corporate, capital
and labor income. Individuals' labor income is subject to an additional ﬂat social security
contribution of 7.8 percent, and two additional and highly progressive surtaxes. The top marginal
tax rate on labor income was 55.3 percent before 2005 and 47.8 percent from 2006 and onward.
In addition, geographically diﬀerentiated social security contributions of maximum 14.1 percent
apply to all wage payments on employer level.
Prior to 2006, capital gains from the realization of shares were taxable at 28%, though the
part of capital gains stemming from withheld proﬁts in the ﬁrm was tax free. Dividends were
tax exempt before 2006.2
A shareholder income tax was ﬁrst proposed by an advisory committee on February 6th 2003.
A revised version was presented by the government on March 26th 2004, and sanctioned by the
Parliament on June 11th 2004, to be introduced on January 1st 2006. The shareholder income
tax levies a tax of 28% on all personal shareholders' income from shares, both dividends and
capital gains. An imputed risk-free return to the share, the so-called Rate-of-Return-Allowance
(RRA), is tax exempt. The RRA is imputed as the average interest rate on government bonds
times the purchasing price of the share. Any unused RRA is carried forward and added to the
imputed RRA in the following year. The share-speciﬁc RRA cannot be transferred between
1Publicly traded ﬁrms may also have other motives beyond taxes for their dividend policy. Under the signaling
theory, (publicly traded) ﬁrms are reluctant to cut dividend payments, as this is perceived as a negating signal
of proﬁtability to the market [Lintner, 1956, Allen and Michaely, 2003].
2There are two noteworthy modiﬁcations to this tax exemption. First, under the pre-2006 tax regime, owners
who worked in their closely-held ﬁrms had tax incentives to withdraw income from their ﬁrm in the form of tax
free dividends instead of labor income. To avoid such income shifting, a so-called split model applied to owners
with 2/3 or more of shares in the ﬁrm they (or their immediate family) worked. For these owners, a speciﬁc and
imputed return to real capital could be distributed as tax free dividends to the owners. Any remaining share
of corporate proﬁts was taxed as wage income, independent of how it was distributed to the owner. Due to the
imputation rule, owner-managers in ﬁrms with low capital and/or few employees had incentives to reduce total
ownership in the ﬁrm (just) below 2/3, inducing ﬁrms to have more dispersed ownership. After the removal of
this split model on January 1st 2006, this incentive disappeared. See Lindhe et al. [2004] and Thoresen and
Alstadsæter [2010] for details. Second, in 2001 there was a temporary dividend tax of 11% (with a small, ﬁxed,
tax free amount of NOK 10,000 per shareholder). It was announced on September 5th 2000, valid for all dividends
that were decided to be distributed from that day and onward. This was removed from January 1st 2002 due
to a change in government. The intention was to evaluate and ﬁnd a more permanent way to tax dividends and
restrict income shifting in the future. See Table 1.
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diﬀerent types of shares, and only the owner at the end of the year beneﬁts from the imputed
RRA for that year. Sørensen [2005] and Alstadsæter and Fjærli [2009] provide more information
on the shareholder income tax.
Under the shareholder income tax, no tax is levied on ﬁrms' income from shares, neither
on dividends nor on capital gains.3 In fact, the tax on realized capital gains from shares for
corporate owners was unexpectedly removed already on March 26th 2004, i.e. long before the
introduction of the shareholder income tax. The tax rates and changes in such are displayed in
Table 1 below.
The top marginal tax rate on income from self-employment equals the top marginal tax rate
on labor income. Prior to 2006, when dividends were tax exempt, high income self-employed had
incentives to incorporate in order to save taxes, as emphasized by Thoresen and Alstadsæter
[2010]. The introduction of a dividend tax in 2006 in combination with a reduction in the
top marginal tax rate on labor income, partly removed these tax incentives for incorporation
for self-employed individuals. Most of our analysis is performed on the sample of ﬁrms that
existed throughout the period mitigating concerns about any incorporation/self-employment
adjustments playing a role.
3.2 Incentives for changes in behavior
Pre-2004, corporate capital gains and dividends were treated in the same way as personal ones; as
of March 2004 corporate capital gains were privileged relative to individual ones and in 2006 both
capital gains and dividends on the corporate level were treated favorably relative to individual
ones. As the result, the changes introduced incentives to hold ownership stake in a ﬁrm through
another entity rather than directly. A transition rule in eﬀect between December 10th 2004
and December 31st 2005 enabled personal shareholders to transfer their shares to a holding ﬁrm
(E-ﬁrm) without triggering the capital gains taxes that would otherwise apply, given certain
restrictions. As documented by Alstadsæter et al. [2013], approximately 16,000 holding ﬁrms
were established under this rule, mainly during the last few months of 2005. Approximately
9% of existing non-listed ﬁrms at the end of 2004 had at least some of the owners electing to
transfer their stake to a holding company during 2005.
In present value terms, and given constant accrual-based tax system and rates of return
after 2006, there is no tax saving in deferring dividend taxes through the setup of a holding
company. But there are still tax beneﬁts of doing this. First, the deferral enables tax free
growth of assets within the holding company. Second, it allows for pooling of losses and gains
from various enterprises within a single holding company level. The shareholder income tax
does not allow RRA to be transferred across diﬀerent types of shares, and at realization, unused
RRAs are lost at shareholder level. At company level, there is no dividend tax and thus no
unused RRA to be lost at realization. This will then increase the total RRA of the owner of
3From 2009 a small tax on dividends and capital gains was introduced for corporate shareholders as well; 3%
of dividends and gains were subject to taxation, rendering an eﬀective tax rate on income from shares of 0.8%.
From 2012 and onward, this tax was removed for capital gains realized by ﬁrms.
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the holding company, as the personal shareholder's RRA is based on his share of the external
equity in the holding company, which is unaﬀected by this transaction. Third, holding shares
through a holding company allows the personal shareholder to determine ultimate payout in
ﬁrms with multiple owners. Fourth, the investor may make a policy bet on the dividend tax
to be removed in the future, and ﬁfth, a personally fully owned holding company facilitates the
investor's ability to shift parts of his private consumption to the ﬁrm.
In preparation for the announced dividend tax for personal shareholders in 2006, there were
huge incentives to shift dividends across time and maximize dividend payments before the intro-
duction of the tax. However, emptying the companies of cash and internal equity then increases
leverage and leaves the ﬁrm more vulnerable for diﬃculties in raising new loans, and in worst
case, this increases the risk of bankruptcy. One way to avoid that is to reinvest (tax free) dis-
tributed dividend as external equity so that liquidity of the company is unaﬀected. Inserted
equity can then be distributed tax free to shareholders in the future, as long as there is no
capital gain involved. This could also be done in one operation without even distributing divi-
dends, if the general assembly decides to convert internal equity to external equity. Estimates
from Statistics Norway based on national accounts suggest that 73% of dividends received by
households and non-proﬁt organizations in 2005 were reinvested in the corporate sector, either
as debt or equity [Alstadsæter and Fjærli, 2009], and we will show micro evidence of these eﬀects
as well.
In the presence of the new dividend tax, ﬁrms have a stronger incentive to retain rather than
distribute earnings in order to defer tax liability although, naturally, it depends on the potential
economic use of funds. The incentive to use company rather than personal funds for categories
that can be funded in either way (i.e. for which private and corporate spending are substitutes)
strengthens unambiguously though. The incentives for personal consumption within the ﬁrm was
strong also before the 2006-reform, in particular through the value added tax of 25% which the
ﬁrm can deduce before the proﬁt tax is levied, as well as trough the tax deductible depreciation
of durable assets in the ﬁrm in addition to any deductible ﬁnancing costs. But the additional
dividend tax strengthens these incentives by raising the costs of distributing corporate proﬁts
for private consumption as dividends by 28%.
To summarize, tax changes announced during the years 2004 to 2006 created the following
changes in incentives:
1. After the reform, it is better to have corporate rather than personal owners. This implies
a shift towards more indirect ownership by individuals.
2. In anticipation of the reform, ﬁrms should pay out as much dividends as possible before
2006 and reduce dividend distributions to personal shareholders from 2006 and onward.
3. Firms have incentives to reinvest extraordinarily high dividends in 2005 as inserted equity.
4. After the reform, the incentive to retain earnings is stronger and, in particular, the incentive
to substitute corporate spending for private spending becomes very strong.
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In this paper we document responses to these incentives.
4 Data
4.1 Data sources
We use detailed administrative data from two data sources maintained by Statistics Norway.
Every ﬁrm and resident in Norway is provided one unique personal identiﬁer which is present in
all data sources, enabling us to follow every ﬁrm and individual over time and across data sets.
1. The shareholder register. It contains records of every shareholder of every Norwegian ﬁrm
from 2004 to 2011. Ownership information is as of December 31 each year. There is also
information of each shareholder that has received dividends during the year, even if the
shareholder does not hold shares at year end. Because we observe this information for a
number of subsequent years, we can also trace changes in the ownership structure such as
transfers of an existing ﬁrm.
2. The accounting register. It contains accounts and balance sheet information from the
ﬁnancial statements of every non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm for every year 1999-2011.4
4.2 Sample deﬁnition
The sample(s) we use in our analysis include ﬁrms that meet a set of conditions. In principle,
the shareholder register contains all ﬁrms,5 while the accounting register contains every non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrm. Our ﬁrst condition is that we restrict attention to the sub-set of ﬁrms available
in both data sources. Further, we limit attention to ﬁrms that exist in both 2004 and 2005 and,
for most of the analysis, focus on a balanced set of ﬁrms that existed throughout the period.
We eliminate ﬁrms that were publicly traded or had at least 1% foreign owners in 2005.6
4.3 Deﬁnition of variables
Information on distributed dividends from each ﬁrm to each of its shareholders during a cal-
endar year is available from the shareholder register. Distributed dividends are the actually
dividends paid during the year. From the accounting register we also have access to the sum of
proposed (ordinary) dividends of the ﬁrm as decided by the general assembly when closing the
4As in the U.S., however, the book and tax statements are not the same, since tax accounts/balance sheet
submissions may be required to provide more detailed information than the ﬁnancial statements, or since the
rules for how to set up the tax accounts/balance sheet may be somewhat diﬀerent from the rules related to the
ﬁnancial statements.
5However, around 5-10 percent of ﬁrms do not report to the shareholder register each year, according to the
Norwegian Tax Administration.
6By excluding ﬁrms that did not exist in both of the years 2004 and 2005 we also remove a special category
of ﬁrms (E-ﬁrms) that were set up as holding companies in 2005 (see Alstadsæter et al. 2013 for details).
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books for the previous year.7 The proposed dividends may diﬀer from actual dividends because
shareholders may choose to pay additional dividends after the assembly.8 While the correlation
between distributed dividends and proposed dividends is very high, it is possible that distributed
dividends turn out lower (if the ﬁrm for some reason ends up not paying) or higher (if special
dividends are decided by a special general assembly) than the proposed dividends. Information
on distributed dividends is available for the years 2004-2011. In addition, information on every
ﬁrm's industry, foundation date and whether it is publicly traded, are also collected from the
accounting register.
Using the shareholder register we can identify how dividend receipts are distributed to the
following groups of shareholders: personal owners; corporate owners; and foreigners and others.
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We will use information about whether owners are persons or other ﬁrms in what follows.
In order to identify owners of the ﬁrm at the entry into the given year, we use information
from the shareholder register at the end of the previous year. Thus, the ﬁrst year of ownership
information is 2005. For ﬁrms founded within the year, data on owners at beginning of the year
(and at foundation) are not available, so for these ﬁrms we set the owners at the beginning of
the year equal to the owners at the end of the foundation year. We deﬁne as corporately owned
those ﬁrms that are solely owned by corporations, while we classify ﬁrms as personally owned if
they have any personal owner (even if they have some corporate ones). Because ownership of a
ﬁrm may and does change over the years, we will usually deﬁne ownership based on information
as of 2005.
To the sample of ﬁrms in the shareholder register, with information about paid dividends in
the year and about owners at entry into the year, we merge in accounting information for the
same calendar. We use several variables from the accounting register. Earned equity corresponds
to accumulated retained proﬁts that have not yet been paid out to the shareholders, and in this
measure we include proposed dividends that are not yet distributed. We will also deﬁne total
equity as the sum of earned equity and external equity.
We will be particularly interested in ﬁrms that maximize dividends. To deﬁne dividend max-
imizers, we operationalize the two main legal restrictions on dividends. First, only accumulated
earned equity from the balance sheet of the previous year can be distributed in the given year.
Our operationalization of earned equity is a proxy, since there are additional factors (which we
do not have data to incorporate) that should be deducted from our measure of earned equity
to ﬁnd the exact legal limit on dividends. Our measure may thus over-estimate legal dividends
somewhat. Second, remaining equity after dividend payments needs to be at least 10% of total
assets, again as stated in the balance sheet of the previous year. In deﬁning dividend maximiz-
7While proposed dividends are deﬁned as corresponding to the previous accounting year, in this paper we align
the timing of proposed and distributed dividends so that they correspond to the payout in the same calendar
year.
8This is similar to the distinction between ordinary and special dividends in the US (though it is not the same
as extraordinary dividends, since the additional dividends over the original proposed dividend need not be large).
9The latter group also includes a small number of owners with missing or incorrect personal/corporate iden-
tiﬁcation numbers.
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ers we use proposed rather than distributed dividends for two reasons. First, we do not observe
actually distributed dividends before 2004 and using proposed dividends allows for illustrating
the patterns before 2004. Second, we do not have suﬃcient information to fully implement rules
applying to special dividends and thus can be much more precise using proposed dividends.
We divide the sample of personally owned ﬁrms into three groups. Some ﬁrms have no
earned equity (because they have paid it out in the past or have accumulated losses) or their
equity level is below 10% of assets. Such ﬁrms have no ability to legally pay any dividends.
The remaining ﬁrms can pay dividends. Some of them hit one of the two constraints that we
just mentioned  we will refer to them as dividend maximizers  and others (dividend non-
maximizers) do not. We deﬁne as maximizers ﬁrms that after proposing the positive dividend
have the equity/asset ratio of between 0.09 and 0.11 or that propose a dividend exceeding 95%
of its earned equity.
Our variables are measured in thousand Norwegian Kroner (NOK); the exchange rate be-
tween 2000 and 2011 ﬂuctuated in the range of approximately 5 to 9 NOK per US dollar. When
we focus on balance sheet variables measured in NOK, we usually work with levels  this is
because many of our variables can be negative or zero. To deal with wide distribution, we
winsorize all variables at 1% and 99%, for each year separately.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the 44,905 diﬀerent ﬁrms in our balanced sample
that existed all years in the period 1999-2011, The most important thing to observe is that
these are small ﬁrms, with the median number of both employees and owners being only two.
Operating income and proﬁts are not impressive, with medians of NOK 2.5 Million and NOK
0.18 million. It is also noteworthy that, despite the imposed sample restrictions, these ﬁrms are
highly heterogeneous, typically with means substantially higher than medians. However, for the
number of owners, the median and the mean are both low, and even the 95th percentile is only
7. This underlines that our sample mainly consists of small ﬁrms with few owners for which
interaction of individual and ﬁrm incentives cannot be ignored. A clear majority of the ﬁrms
belong to the two (NACE) industry categories Wholesale and retail, repairs; and Real estate,
renting and business activities.
5 Responses in anticipation of the reform
5.1 Dividend and ownership patterns
Figure 1 shows the pattern of actual distributed dividends starting in 2004. The overall level of
dividends in 2004 and 2005 vastly exceeded that in the following years. Over 40% of ﬁrms in
2004 and 50% of ﬁrms in 2005 paid dividends, the number that drops below 20% in 2006 and
stays below 30% in the following years.
In Figure 2, we show evidence of a response to the ownership incentives, where we have
classﬁed ﬁrms into three groups: solely privately owned, solely corporately owned and mixed-
ownership. In the balanced sample of ﬁrms that existed throughout the period we study, struc-
ture of ownership is very stable except for a one-time sharp shift in 2006. Between 2005 and
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2006, the number of ﬁrms with purely corporate ownership has nearly doubled, while the num-
ber of ﬁrms with purely private ownership has decreased by approximately the same amount,
with an increase in mixed ownership making up the diﬀerence. This corresponds to transfer of
ownership to holding companies that are studied by Alstadsæter et al. [2013]. Such transfers
may be implemented by each owner separately so that ultimate ownership is mixed, but Figure
2 suggests that in most cases all personal ownership has been transformed into corporate one.
As mentioned before, we will use two groups in the rest of our analysis. Corporately owned
ﬁrms are those solely owned by corporations, while we classify ﬁrms as personally owned if
they have any personal owners (even if they have some corporate owners). In order to keep
the composition of the two groups constant, we will typically rely on ownership structure in
2005 to classify ﬁrms. The pattern of dividend payments is driven by ﬁrms that were owned by
individuals rather than corporations, as shown in Figure 3. Impressively, over 60% of privately
owned ﬁrms chose to pay dividends in 2005. Interestingly, the same pattern is visible for ﬁrms
that have transformed their ownership to corporate one in the aftermath of the reform, as shown
in Figure 4.10 While setting up a holding company allows for deferring dividend tax, the return
will still be subject to taxation at a later date when proﬁts retained in a holding company
are going to be distributed either as dividends or capital gains. Thus, paying dividends in
anticipation of the reform is a tax saving strategy even for ﬁrms that convert to corporate
ownership.
In Figure 5 we show that propensity to pay any dividends varies with the number of owners
of a ﬁrm, but the time series pattern is the same regardless of the number of owners.
5.2 Dividend maximization and external equity substitution
As mentioned before, in order to assess the importance of incentives introduced by the reform and
the strength of response, we construct a proxy for a ﬁrm being constrained in paying dividends.
We divide the sample of privately owned ﬁrms into three groups. Some ﬁrms have no earned
equity or their equity level is below 10% of assets. Such ﬁrms have no ability to legally pay any
dividends. In our balanced sample, there are a bit more than 20% of such ﬁrms every year and
the share is fairly smooth; see Figure 6. The remaining ﬁrms can pay dividends, and as described
in Section 4.3 we have divided them into dividend maximizers and dividend non-maximizers.
Figure 6 illustrates the relative share of each type in our balanced panel over time. In years
before or after the reform, the number of ﬁrms that maximize their dividends is small. In 2005,
however, nearly half of the ﬁrms that have the ability to pay dividends (almost 40% of the whole
sample) decide to maximize their payouts. Given that just over 60% of these ﬁrms pay any
dividends, the median ﬁrm that pays dividends in 2005 does so to the maximum extent possible.
Propensity to maximize dividends also appears somewhat elevated in 2003 and 2004. The
decision to propose dividends for 2003 for sure precedes the announcement of the reform, while
the decision for 2004 may have preceded it for some ﬁrm but not for most of them.11 The
10Figure 2 indicates that the bulk of such such changes took place between 2005 and 2006.
11Proposed dividends for accounting year t-1 are decided at a general assembly that typically takes place in
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pre-reform trend in dividends may also be aﬀected by the presence of a (diﬀerent) dividend tax
in late 2000 and 2001 (see footnote 2) and the possibility of introducing a new tax (as ultimately
happened) being on the political agenda. After 2005, the incidence of maximization of dividends
drops precipitously.
Given ﬁrms' attempts to maximize dividends, one might expect that ﬁrms' liquidity and
overall assets will decline. We investigate it by looking at changes in the level of external
(shareholder equity) and total equity. The dividend tax depletes earned equity. As Figure
7 shows though, 2004 and 2005 also feature unusually high increases in external equity. Put
diﬀerently, owners of ﬁrms in 2004 and 2005 tripled or so their direct investments in their ﬁrms.
As the result, there is no discernible eﬀect on the change in the total equity of these ﬁrms. Figure
8 shows the extensive margin. Increasing external equity is a relatively rare event  in a typical
year, only about 5% of ﬁrms do so. In 2005, however, this number nearly doubles. Furthermore,
as Figure 9 illustrates, the incidence of matching external equity changes and dividend payments
one-for-one, while rare in general, spikes in 2005.
6 Behavior in the aftermath of the reform
In the previous section, we documented that ﬁrms responded in anticipation of the reform by
distributing dividends prior to the reform. At the same time, they also took measures to limit
the impact on their liquidity by re-injecting external equity. There is a possibility then that
nothing about the activity of the ﬁrm changes as the result of the reform, at least on impact.
This is puzzling though. In the new regime, the return to outside funds is aﬀected, a scenario
stressed by the old view of the dividend taxation. Firms that paid dividends and re-injected
external equity appear to have an ability to manipulate their outside funding, so that the old
view may in fact be applicable and one would then expect scaling down the size of the ﬁrm in
response to adverse incentives. There are a few alternative possibilities though. First, assuming
that injection of external equity is equivalent to issuing new equity is not necessarily appropriate
if ﬁrms face adjustment costs or liquidity constraints  in that case, the whole point of combined
dividend/external equity scenario is to keep things constant and the marginal source of funds
for additional projects (rather than maintaining current ones) may well be retained earnings if
any (so that the new view applies). Second, owners may be focusing on the salient beneﬁt
of avoiding the dividend tax on already accumulated earnings, and ignoring the importance of
the dividend tax in reducing the return to additional investments. Third, such a strategy is
completely rational if ﬁrms do not expect that re-investment will lead to taxable dividends in
the future. This would be so if the additional investments are in fact a substitute for the same
type of behavior outside of the ﬁrm  a tax shelter-like activity.
In what follows, we will analyze behavior of ﬁrms in the aftermath of the reform. We will
ﬁrst show that after the reform ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely to retain earnings. Then, we
will compare outcomes for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms that were diﬀerently aﬀected by the reform,
May/June in year t, and are payable in year t. The reform was announced March 26, 2004.
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in order to learn about the association between incentives and ﬁrm behavior.
In Table 3 we show the sensitivity of changes in retained earnings and dividends to after-tax
proﬁts, for ﬁrms with personal owners. This is done by regressing the outcome variable on year
dummies and their interactions with proﬁts, on a balanced panel with standard errors clustered
on ﬁrm level. We do not claim that the results represent a causal relationship, but they allow for
investigating how the correlations between proﬁts and dividends or equity changed over time.
The baseline is 2003: in that year, an additional 1NOK of proﬁts is associated with 0.41NOK
increase in retained earnings and 0.39NOK increase in ordinary dividends. This relationship is
stable between 2002 and 2005. In particular, the lack of a signiﬁcant change in this association
in 2005 suggests that factors other than current proﬁts (and not strongly associated with them),
such as availability of accumulated (rather than current) earnings were primary determinants
of dividend distribution decisions. This relationship changes dramatically in the immediate
aftermath of the reform when the association of proﬁts and retained earnings raises to nearly
one,12 while association of proﬁts and dividends falls to close to zero. In the years that follow,
retained earnings remain much more sensitive to proﬁts than prior to the reform and association
of dividends and proﬁts remains very weak.
These results indicate that following the reform we should expect to see increases in retained
earnings. This is indeed the case, as Figure 10 illustrates. This, and the following ﬁgures,
normalize all series to 1 for 2004 in order to facilitate the comparison across groups. Average
earned equity (retained earnings) starts to increase immediately and rapidly after the reform.
These eﬀects are very large and in sharp contrast to the behavior of the ﬁrms prior to the reform.
By 2009, the undistributed earnings accumulated by the ﬁrms double. The ﬁgure shows both
the eﬀect on personally owned and corporate owned ﬁrms (using the status as of 2005). While
distributed proﬁts of both types of ﬁrms are going to be eventually subject to capital income
taxation when distributed to ultimate personal shareholders, ﬁrms with corporate ownership
structure have additional degrees of freedom, because payouts to corporate parents does not
trigger immediate tax liability. Hence, one may expect that the eﬀect of tax incentives will be
muted for corporate ﬁrms. It does indeed appear so in the case of retained earnings. While
retention increases for both types of ﬁrms, the eﬀect after a few years is much stronger for
privately owned ﬁrms.
Our alternative strategy for identifying ﬁrms that are diﬀerentially aﬀected by the reform
relies on their behavior in 2004/5. We classify personally-owned ﬁrms as dividend maximizers if
they maximized (distributed) dividends in either 2004 or 2005 and as non-maximizers otherwise.
This is of course an endogenous choice. However, this selected group of ﬁrms that maximize
dividends may be expected to be more responsive to tax consideration. In Figure 10, we show
that dividend maximizers are indeed accumulating more retained earnings after a few years and
we ﬁnd no evidence of a diﬀerence in the retention pattern of the two groups prior to the reform.
The pattern of debt does not exhibit sharp changes after the reform and trends are parallel for
the two groups (in either strategy), with the exception of 2004, suggesting that some of the
12The sum of the baseline coeﬃcient on proﬁts and the year-speciﬁc eﬀect.
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increased dividend payouts may have been ﬁnanced by (short-term) loans.
In Figures 11 and 12, we illustrate evolution of variables that proxy for real economic activity.
Overall proﬁts undergo large changes during the 2000s, with an expansion beginning in 2003 or
so, peak in 2007 and a drop during the crisis that followed. Using both of our strategies for
splitting the data, ﬁrms that are expected to be more responsive to the tax incentives aﬀected
by the reform have lower proﬁts beginning with 2005 and very similar patterns prior to that.
These lower proﬁts are associated with both lower operating income and lower operating costs
(and not much diﬀerence in wages), which suggest a lower level of economic activity. This
is revealing in the light of just documented eﬀect on retained earnings: since the same ﬁrms
are actually retaining more of their earnings, one might have expected that they expand their
economic activity and yet the opposite occurs. Hence, these results suggest that retaining
earnings stimulated by tax incentives does not correspond to proﬁtable economic activity but
may in fact reﬂect other considerations.
In Figures 13 and 14 we focus on the asset side of the balance sheet. Consistently with the
eﬀect on earned equity, the overall assets for privately owned ﬁrms and their dividend-maximizing
subset, increase relatively more. Overall assets can be grouped into four components: long-term
ﬁnancial assets, durable (real) assets, intangible assets and current assets (inventories, cash and
short-term investments). The diﬀerence between tax-sensitive and insensitive groups is present
for ﬁnancial assets and durable assets, but much less obvious for current assets (and, if anything,
going in the opposite direction). The latter is consistent with the notion that current assets are
more tightly linked to current real economic activity (e.g., one might expect that inventories and
cash holdings are correlated with ﬁrms' core business activity), further supporting the previous
ﬁnding that ﬁrms aﬀected by the tax reform have actually experienced a relative decline in their
economic activity.
Individuals are subject to the shareholder income tax, with a marginal tax of 28% on divi-
dends and capital gains. Firms pay no taxes on income from shares and the eﬀect on ﬁnancial
assets indicates that ﬁrms are increasingly used as a vehicle for ﬁnancial saving and investment.
As is seen in Figure 13, ﬁrms that were personally held in 2005 drastically increased their ﬁnan-
cial assets in the aftermath of the reform, compared with ﬁrms that were owned by corporate
shareholders. Also, ﬁrms that maximized dividends in 2005, also increase their stock of ﬁnancial
assets relatively more after 2006; see Figure 14.
The eﬀect on durable assets is also very pronounced. We show particular subcategories of
ﬁxed assets in Figure 15. Ownership of machinery and ships and planes has dramatically in-
creased, with the eﬀect more pronounced among ﬁrms that are more sensitive to tax incentives.13
Our data do not allow for direct investigation of the nature of this response but two possibilities
are using retained earnings to substitute from leasing to ownership and investing in assets that
can be used for personal consumption rather than business activity. Tax authorities are aware
of such attempts to conceal purchases of private durable good (horses, planes, luxury boats,
13The magnitude of response of these variables reﬂect the fact that much of response takes place on the extensive
margin with many ﬁrms beginning to report non-zero values in later years.
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houses etc.) as business expenses and attempt to limit this type of tax evasion. For example, in
June 2013 they issued a press release stating14 that over the prior two years they had detected
NOK90 million in tax evasion among ﬁrm owners who use luxury boats at the cost of their ﬁrm.
They also explicitly stated that the 2006 introduction of dividend tax was a possible reason for
this.
Both ships/planes category (which may include private boats and yachts as well as private
jets), and the machinery/equipment category (which has also been identiﬁed by tax authorities
as being used to conceal private durable goods), show patterns indicating their increased use
by tax-sensitive ﬁrms. Furthermore, in Figure 16, we show a category of other durables that
includes assets that are likely to be used for personal consumption  notably company cars (also
smaller categories such as oﬃce equipments). This category of assets also underwent a striking
evolution in the aftermath of the reform, responding sharply right after its introduction and,
again, showing stronger eﬀect for the tax sensitive groups despite their lower level of economic
activity. Overall, these results suggests that retained earnings are invested in both ﬁnancial and
real assets, but heterogeneity across diﬀerent types of ﬁrms indicates that such investments are
not associated with real economic activity.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we documented the eﬀect of a 2006 Norwegian dividend tax reform on the behavior
of closely-held ﬁrms. As expected, an anticipated dividend tax increase stimulated dividend
payments prior to the reform and the response was aggressive: nearly half of the ﬁrms that
could pay dividends, did so to the maximum extent possible. This anticipation response has all
the hallmarks of a purely tax-motivated response because it is accompanied by re-injection of
equity into ﬁrms so that their net balance sheets is largely not aﬀected.
In the aftermath of the reform, ﬁrms begin to retain earnings at a much faster pace than
before. In particular, the strength of association of proﬁts and changes in retained earnings
increases, while the association of proﬁts and dividends falls almost to zero. We focus on two
groups that are likely to be particularly aﬀected by tax incentives: personally owned ﬁrms and
the self-selected subset of them that chose to maximize their dividend payouts prior to the
reform. We ﬁnd that both of these groups exhibit lower level of economic activity relative to
their complements (respectively, corporately owned ﬁrms and privately owned ones that did not
maximize dividends in 2004/5): their revenue and costs are lower, and so are their proﬁts. At the
same time though, there is no evidence that these ﬁrms get relatively smaller. To the contrary:
the more tax-aﬀected ﬁrms accumulate more of retained earnings and end up with higher total
assets. Hence, more distorting dividend tax incentives appear to be simultaneously associated
with larger ﬁrm and less real economic activity. The asset increase is visible in both the ﬁnancial
and real asset category, in particular in the categories including machines, equipment, boats,
14Norwegian Tax Assessment Region Øst Press Release Number 11/2013, dated 6/27/2013; See also http:
//www.ba.no/jobbmagasinet/article6732282.ece accessed on 10/24/2013.
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planes and company cars. The puzzle here is why ﬁrms that appear to invest more in real and
ﬁnancial assets are not seeing a corresponding eﬀect on proﬁts, revenue and operating costs.
The possible explanation for these eﬀects is that an increase in retention does not serve the
main economic purpose of the ﬁrm but is instead invested within a ﬁrm in a way that beneﬁts
shareholders without associated proﬁtability. The leading examples of such activity are using a
ﬁrm as a substitute for private saving and using ﬁrm's real assets for personal use. Hence, our
results appear consistent with the dividend tax stimulating the closely-held corporate tax sector
to become more passive in terms of real economic activity and more active as a tax shelter.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Median
Fraction with value Percentile
Mean N
equal to or below zero 5th 95th
Employees 2 0.36 0 28 8.8 44 716
Operating income 2 536 0.09 0 49 091 20 632 44 905
Proﬁts 183 0.23 -304 4 865 2 452 44 905
Number of owners 2 1 7 3.5 44 898
Industry groups (EU's NACE standard)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry; ﬁshing; mining and quarrying 0.03 44 880
Manufacturing; electricity, gas and water supply 0.10 44 880
Construction 0.10 44 880
Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 0.24 44 880
Hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication 0.08 44 880
Financial intermediation 0.00 44 880
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.40 44 880
Other 0.06 44 880
Note: All variables are measured in 2004. Monetary variables are in thousands of NOK. The sample comprises
the 44,905 ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-2011).
Table 3: Sensitivity of a change in retained earnings and dividends to proﬁts
∆ earned equity Dividends
Proﬁts 0.41 8.92 0.39 33.77
Proﬁts#year
2000 0.21 3.68 -0.15 -11.86
2001 0.43 7.36 -0.24 -21.11
2002 0.00 0.03 -0.09 -7.03
2003 . . . .
2004 0.03 0.43 -0.09 -6.73
2005 -0.08 -1.21 0.02 1.51
2006 0.57 11.09 -0.36 -31.18
2007 0.60 11.07 -0.30 -25.58
2008 0.25 4.26 -0.26 -20.85
2009 0.17 2.88 -0.32 -27.29
2010 0.16 2.85 -0.31 -26.47
2011 0.20 3.31 -0.29 -24.51
N 440 496 440 496
R2 0.30 0.26
Note: Development of association with after-tax proﬁts for change in earned equity and proposed dividends by
year, shown as interactions between proﬁts and year (relative to 2003). Point estimate (followed by t-statistic)
from OLS regressions run on the balanced panel of ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-2011) and were personally
owned in 2005. Year dummies (2003 omitted) included in both models but estimates not reported. Standard
errors clustered on ﬁrm level.
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Figure 1: Trends in dividend payments
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Note: Dividend payments for ﬁrms existing in all years 1999-2011; total amount of dividends (left axis) and
fraction of ﬁrms paying dividends (right axis).
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Figure 2: Restructuring
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Note: Ownership structure in each year for ﬁrms existing in all years 1999-2011.
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Figure 3: Firms paying dividends by initial ownership status
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Note: Fraction of ﬁrms that paid dividends in each year, by ownership status in 2005. The sample comprises
ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-2011).
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Figure 4: Firms paying dividends by change in ownership status
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Note: Fraction of ﬁrms that paid dividends in each year, by change in ownership structure 2005-2011. The sample
comprises ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-2011).
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Figure 5: Propensity to pay dividends by number of owners in 2005
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
1 owner 5 owners
9+ owners
Note: Fraction of personally owned ﬁrms in 2005 that paid dividends in a given year, by number of owners in
2005. The sample comprises ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-2011).
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Figure 6: Ability to pay dividends and dividend maximization
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Note: Fraction of ﬁrms that maximize dividends in each year. Dividend maximization deﬁned by equity to asset
ratio close to 0.1 or dividends greater than 95% of earned equity (see text for details). The sample comprises
ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-2011) and were personally owned in 2005.
Figure 7: Changes in external and total equity over time
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Note: The sample comprises ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-2011).
28
Figure 8: Fraction of ﬁrms increasing external equity
.
04
.
06
.
08
.
1
.
12
2000 2005 2010
Note: Fraction of ﬁrms increasing external equity by more than NOK 50,000 relative to previous year. The
sample comprises ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-2011).
Figure 9: Firms with change in external equity similar to dividend payment
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Note: Fraction of ﬁrms with a change in external equity of similar magnitude as the dividend payment (i.e.
change in external equity between 0.95 and 1.05 of dividend). The sample comprises ﬁrms that existed in all
years (1999-2011).
29
F
ig
ur
e
10
:
A
cc
um
ul
at
ed
re
ta
in
ed
ea
rn
in
gs
an
d
de
bt
by
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
st
at
us
.511.522.5
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
Ea
rn
ed
 e
qu
ity
.6.811.21.4
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
To
ta
l d
eb
t
.511.522.5
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
Ea
rn
ed
 e
qu
ity
.511.5
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
To
ta
l d
eb
t
N
o
te
:
M
ea
n
s
o
f
va
ri
a
b
le
s
n
o
rm
a
li
ze
d
to
1
in
2
0
0
4
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
m
p
ri
se
s
ﬁ
rm
s
th
a
t
ex
is
te
d
in
a
ll
y
ea
rs
(1
9
9
9
-2
0
1
1
).
30
F
ig
ur
e
11
:
R
ea
l
ec
on
om
ic
ou
tc
om
es
by
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
st
at
us
in
20
05
.511.5
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
Pr
of
its
.811.21.41.6
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
W
ag
es
.811.21.41.6
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
R
ev
en
ue
.811.21.41.6
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
O
pe
ra
tin
g 
co
st
s
N
o
te
:
M
ea
n
s
o
f
va
ri
a
b
le
s
n
o
rm
a
li
ze
d
to
1
in
2
0
0
4
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
m
p
ri
se
s
ﬁ
rm
s
th
a
t
ex
is
te
d
in
a
ll
y
ea
rs
(1
9
9
9
-2
0
1
1
).
31
F
ig
ur
e
12
:
R
ea
l
ec
on
om
ic
ou
tc
om
es
by
di
vi
de
nd
m
ax
im
iz
at
io
n
st
at
us
in
20
04
/5
.511.5
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
Pr
of
its
.811.21.41.6
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
W
ag
es
 o
f f
irm
s
.811.21.41.6
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
R
ev
en
ue
.811.21.41.6
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
O
pe
ra
tin
g 
co
st
s
N
o
te
:
M
ea
n
s
o
f
va
ri
a
b
le
s
n
o
rm
a
li
ze
d
to
1
in
2
0
0
4
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
m
p
ri
se
s
ﬁ
rm
s
th
a
t
ex
is
te
d
in
a
ll
y
ea
rs
(1
9
9
9
-2
0
1
1
).
32
F
ig
ur
e
13
:
A
ss
et
s
by
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
st
at
us
in
20
05
.811.21.41.61.8
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
To
ta
l a
ss
et
s
.511.522.5
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
Fi
na
nc
ia
l a
ss
et
s
.6.811.21.41.6
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
Cu
rre
nt
 a
ss
et
s
.811.21.4
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
D
ur
ab
le
 a
ss
et
s
N
o
te
:
M
ea
n
s
o
f
va
ri
a
b
le
s
n
o
rm
a
li
ze
d
to
1
in
2
0
0
4
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
m
p
ri
se
s
ﬁ
rm
s
th
a
t
ex
is
te
d
in
a
ll
y
ea
rs
(1
9
9
9
-2
0
1
1
).
33
F
ig
ur
e
14
:
A
ss
et
s
by
di
vi
de
nd
m
ax
im
iz
at
io
n
st
at
us
in
20
04
/5
.511.52
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
To
ta
l a
ss
et
s
.511.522.5
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
Fi
na
nc
ia
l a
ss
et
s
.6.811.21.41.6
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
Cu
rre
nt
 a
ss
et
s
.811.21.4
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
ur
ab
le
 a
ss
et
s
N
o
te
:
M
ea
n
s
o
f
va
ri
a
b
le
s
n
o
rm
a
li
ze
d
to
1
in
2
0
0
4
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
m
p
ri
se
s
ﬁ
rm
s
th
a
t
ex
is
te
d
in
a
ll
y
ea
rs
(1
9
9
9
-2
0
1
1
).
34
F
ig
ur
e
15
:
E
qu
ip
m
en
t
an
d
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
by
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
an
d
di
vi
de
nd
m
ax
im
iz
at
io
n
st
at
us
in
20
04
/5
1234
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
02468
20
00
20
05
20
10
Pe
rs
on
al
 o
w
ne
rs
Co
rp
or
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
Sh
ip
s 
an
d 
pl
an
es
1234
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
02468
20
00
20
05
20
10
D
iv
id
en
d 
m
ax
im
ize
rs
D
iv
id
en
d 
no
n−
m
ax
im
ize
rs
Sh
ip
s 
an
d 
pl
an
es
N
o
te
:
M
ea
n
s
o
f
va
ri
a
b
le
s
n
o
rm
a
li
ze
d
to
1
in
2
0
0
4
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
m
p
ri
se
s
ﬁ
rm
s
th
a
t
ex
is
te
d
in
a
ll
y
ea
rs
(1
9
9
9
-2
0
1
1
).
35
Figure 16: Other durables (including company cars) by ownership and dividend maximization
status in 2004/5
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Note: Means of variables normalized to 1 in 2004. The sample comprises ﬁrms that existed in all years (1999-
2011).
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